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ABSTRACT: This paper explains how grants of monopolistic privileges 
to capitalists can lower labor and land factors’ prices compared to what 
would prevail in a free market environment. Monopoly gains of privileged 
business owners are not only “extracted” from their clients but also from 
factor owners. We revisit Rothbardian monopoly price theory and extend 
it to the realm of factor pricing. Monopolistic grants to capitalists make 
for market situations where both monopoly of demand for factors and 
monopoly of supply for their product are present and inextricably inter-
twined. We conclude that grants of privileges to capitalists can trigger an 
overall downward pressure on original factor prices.
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can successfully prove that workers could be permanently paid 
below their marginal value productivity (discounted by originary 
interest) in the free market. Since he focuses mainly on a defense 
of the free market, he does not go into much detail regarding this 
possibility in a hampered market economy. However, in the course 
of refuting the free market monopoly of demand theory, Mises 
(1998, pp. 591–92) writes:
[Entrepreneurs]  are  under  the  necessity  of  acquiring  all  factors  of 
production at the cheapest price. But if in the pursuit of this endeavor 
some  entrepreneurs,  certain  groups  of  entrepreneurs,  or  all  entre-
preneurs  offer  prices  or  wage  rates  which  are  too  low,  i.e.,  do  not 
agree with the state of the unhampered market, they will succeed in 
acquiring what they want to acquire only if entrance into the ranks of 
entrepreneurship is blocked through institutional barriers. If the emergence 
of  new  entrepreneurs  or  the  expansion  of  the  activities  of  already 
operating entrepreneurs is not prevented, any drop in the prices of 
factors of production not consonant with the structure of the market 
must open new chances for the earning of profits. There will be people 
eager to take advantage of the margin between the prevailing wage 
rate and the marginal productivity of labor. Their demand for labor will 
bring wage rates back to the height conditioned by labor’s marginal 
productivity.  The  tacit  combination  among  the  employers  to  which 
Adam Smith referred, even if it existed, could not lower wages below 
the competitive market rate unless access to entrepreneurship required not 
only brains and capital (the latter always available to enterprises promising 
the highest returns), but in addition also an institutional title, a patent, or a 
license, reserved to a class of privileged people. (emphasis added)
only  privileges  can  hamper  the  bidding  process  that  tends  to 
equate discounted marginal productivity of factors with their prices. 
one can certainly say that this is what Mises considers as a necessary 
condition. But what other contingencies could bring such an outcome? 
What are the sufficient conditions? For Mises, (1998, p. 593)
The employers would be in a position enabling them to lower wage 
rates by concerted action only if they were to monopolize a factor indis-
pensable for every kind of production and to restrict the employment of this 
factor in a monopolistic way. As there is no single material factor indis-
pensable for every kind of production, they would have to monopolize 
all material factors of production. This condition would be present only in a 
socialist community, in which there is neither a market nor prices and 
wage rates.1 (emphasis added)
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However, Mises does not further explore the conceivable inter-
mediate situations between a pure free market and pure socialism2 
regarding the possibility of an overall downward pressure on labor 
factors’ prices (or land factors prices for that matter) under their 
free market levels. In Mises’s and Murray Rothbard’s analysis of 
interventionism, land and labor factors typically find themselves 
on both sides of the distributive process implied in interventions, 
among  the  winners  and  the  losers.3  Notwithstanding,  I  want  to 
show in this paper that at least one kind of intervention can make 
workers and landowners gather on the side of losers while (some 
of) their employers would be beneficiaries of the distributive effect 
involved. I want to show that monopolistic grants of privileges to 
capitalists, insofar as they allow monopoly prices to emerge for their 
products, also bring about an overall relative lowering of prices for 
original factors, in particular labor factors (in other words, that there 
is no need for employers to “monopolize all factors of production” 
to bring about such an outcome). And I want to explain how this 
conclusion can be viewed as an implication of Rothbard’s own work 
on monopoly price theory, an implication that Mises touches upon in 
the quote above when he stresses that the bidding process for factors 
can be hampered because of monopolistic grants of privilege.
In order to do so, I will first recall the basic tenets of Rothbardian 
monopoly theory. They will be taken for granted for the purpose of 
this paper. Then I will draw the implications regarding the impact 
of monopolistic grants on factor prices.
2   “Socialism” is to be understood here in the sense Mises uses, as a society in 
which means of production are state-owned, and does not necessarily imply any 
kind of egalitarianism.
3   This is obviously true for the taxation and public spending process. Cf. Rothbard 
(2004 pp. 1152–53) for example. one could also consider the classic case of a 
maximum price control for a product. If it is effective, would-be buyers at the 
control price will have to face a shortage. What does this imply regarding factor 
pricing? The profitable production level is lower than without price control. If 
entrepreneurs correctly anticipate this, their demand schedules for factors will be 
lower in this industry. However, this does not automatically translate into lower 
prices for these factors. The frustrated demand for the product will be reshuffled 
elsewhere. Specific factors in the expanding sectors will certainly see their prices 
rise as a consequence, as well as some non-specific factors. Furthermore, depending 
on the cases, the factors displaced from the controlled sector may not earn less 
elsewhere if they can be employed in the industries where demand is reshuffled 
since their discounted marginal value productivity schedules will increase there.51 Xavier Méra: Factor Prices Under Monopoly
ROTHBARD’S THEORY OF MONOPOLY PRICE
The basic features of Rothbard’s monopoly price theory4 can be 
summarized as follows. First, one or more persons must of course 
hold a “monopoly.” A monopoly is here understood as an “institution 
or allowance by the king, by his grant, commission, or otherwise 
… to any person or persons, bodies politic or corporate, for the sole 
buying, selling, making, working, or using of anything, whereby 
any person or persons, bodies politic or corporate, are sought to 
be restrained of any freedom or liberty that they had before, or 
hindered in their lawful trade,” in the words of seventeenth century 
lawyer  Lord  Coke.5  However,  in  Rothbard’s  view,  a  monopoly 
simply implies that competition is hampered through violence or 
the threat thereof. It does not necessarily have to be an outright 
grant of monopoly to one firm by the state. Therefore, private Mafia-
like threats of aggression6 against any would-be competitor as well 
as  governmentally  enforced  cartels,  licenses,  compulsory  quality 
standards, tariffs, patents, environmental regulations or any law, 
decree or tax penalizing any form of market organization will do.7
Though Rothbard refers to a definition of monopoly that includes 
monopoly of buying, his focus is on monopoly of selling, which 
brings us to the second requirement. Preferences of people have 
to be such that at one or several prices higher than the free market 
price for a good, the market demand for this good brings more 
monetary income to its sellers, even if the quantity that buyers are 
eager to get is reduced because of the law of marginal utility.
Third, if there is only one seller or if sellers can find an agreement to 
centralize their decision process and act as one, they are in a position 
to profit from this so-called “inelasticity” of demand above the free 
4   See Rothbard (2004, pp. 661–704 and pp. 1089–93). This theory is a modified version 
of Mises’s views on the topic. See Mises (1998a, pp. 354–85) and Mises (1998b). 
Whatever the versions considered, they must not be confused with the view on 
monopoly that one can find in most textbooks these days. The standard textbook 
view on monopoly is actually a special case of a different and more general theory, 
namely the so-called theory of “monopolistic competition.”
5 Quoted in Rothbard (2004, pp. 668–69).
6   Aggression  is  understood  here  as  uninvited  border-crossing  on  someone’s 
property acquired through the first user-first owner rule and subsequent voluntary 
exchanges and gifts. on the nature of property and aggression, see Rothbard (2004, 
pp. 84–102 and pp. 169–75).
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market price by restricting their supply of the product and sell it at a 
higher price called a “monopoly price.”8 Their interest is of course to 
sell it at the price which maximizes their monetary income.9
one can immediately notice here that there is no consideration of 
monetary expenses involved for the seller, no factor prices to worry 
about.  This  is  perfectly  legitimate  of  course.  Since  Carl  Menger, 
Austrians  are  known  to  put  some  particular  emphasis  on  the 
everyday real world pricing process, while the long run equilibrium 
constructs are thought of as an auxiliary tool of analysis.10 Therefore, 
8   Mises (1998a, p. 359) explains that this can be the case even when all the sellers do 
not act as one, provided the entente owns a significant enough part of the supply. 
This is the “incomplete monopoly.” Another condition is that the monopolist is not 
in a position or not willing to discriminate among the buyers. one could add that 
an explicit agreement may not be necessary. All that is really indispensable once 
the stock has been produced is that the demand schedules to individual sellers 
become inelastic as a consequence of monopolistic restrictions.
9   For Mises, as for almost all authors who wrote on this topic, one can conceive 
of a monopoly price that would be distinct from a “competitive” price in the 
free market. In other words, the first requirement we mentioned above would 
not be necessary and the monopoly price theory would not be a theory of inter-
ventionism. only inelasticity of demand and collusion would be required. The 
reason why Rothbard (2004, pp. 687–98) thinks the theory can be valid only in 
the context of a market hampered by state intervention or private coercion can be 
summarized as follows.
Let  us  postulate  a  purely  free  market  society  unhampered  by  coercion.  An 
investor considers where to invest his money. Let us assume he finds himself as 
the sole seller of the kind of good he decides to produce. We are in the presence 
of a monopoly in the sense of a unique seller of a good but we know from Mises’s 
theory that this is not a sufficient condition to have a monopoly price. The question 
is then: does he get a monopoly price or a competitive price? Rothbard’s answer 
is definitive: whatever possibility we consider, competitive or monopoly price, 
the seller chooses to offer the quantity that he can sell at a point above which the 
demand is “elastic.” There is no higher price allowing further total revenue, which 
means that both situations are impossible to differentiate as the seller is in the 
same position vis-à-vis demand. If no difference is identifiable between two things, 
not only practically but even in principle, no conceptual distinction holds between 
the two. Therefore, in a free market there cannot be any competitive or monopoly 
prices. There are only free market prices.
For a defense and elaboration of Mises’s view, see Kirzner (1973, pp. 19–23, and 
pp. 88–134). For a defense and elaborations of Rothbard’s views, see Armentano 
(1988), Armentano (1999, pp. 47–50),  Block (1977), Costea (2003), and Hoppe 
(1989, pp. 167–86).
10   See on this Salerno (2003) with particular application to monopoly price theory 
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the theory can focus on the price of an already produced stock. 
Since past costs involved in the production decisions are forever 
gone, they are not relevant to the determination of price for this 
existing stock.11 However, we are interested here in what happens 
at the production decision point, when entrepreneurs strive for the 
maximum net returns on their investments. This does not make a 
big difference for the theory of monopoly price, as far as Rothbard 
is concerned. The demand for the product must be anticipated and 
production adjusted accordingly.12 And a higher income for a lower 
supply sold must be produced with lower use of factors, with lower 
expenses that is, so that one can be sure net returns are higher thanks 
to the restriction.13, 14
11   Monopoly price theory can conceivably apply to labor factors too. In that case, 
there would be no question of past costs in their production. However, we focus 
here on goods produced with the help of previously produced production factors 
and original factors, in a traditional capitalist firm. Capitalists rent labor and other 
factors (or buy other factors) in advance of the sale of the product, in exchange for 
their productive services in the meantime.
12   There is no reason why the expectations of entrepreneurs should necessarily be 
successful or erroneous. However, this is always true, with or without monopoly, 
since success and errors are ever-present possibilities of action. See on equili-
bration and arbitrage Hülsmann (2000, pp. 16–17). This is why we do not mention 
as a special requirement for the emergence of monopoly price Mises’s idea of a 
“monopolist’s ability to discover such prices,” and Rothbard does not mention it 
anyway. There is nothing special about the monopolist trying to figure out what 
will be the demand for its product. Every producer-future seller has to do that, 
can succeed or fail and accordingly reaps profits or suffers losses.
13   According to Rothbard (2004, p. 674, footnote 39) this holds true unless average 
expenses decrease enough in the relevant range of the scale of production to make 
the free market level of production and free market price more attractive. This 
proviso is highly problematic. If it were true, it would mean that the producer would 
deliberately sell at a price above which the demand is inelastic, a point at which total 
income from the sale would be lower. Therefore, in order for this point to be the 
most remunerative, average expenses would have to fall so much as to make total 
expenses diminish even more than total income. Now no actor would deliberately 
operate in such a region. Furthermore, even if he was choosing to produce the free 
market quantity, it would still not make sense to sell the entire stock while he can 
have a higher total income with a higher than competitive price by restricting sales.
14   Both Rothbard and Mises have repeatedly insisted on inelasticity of demand as a 
necessary requirement for a monopoly price to emerge. However, it is clear from 
the section on the role of increasing and decreasing average spending in Mises 
(1998b, pp. 6–7), that inelasticity of demand is not a necessary criterion. Mises 
draws a table with hypothetical figures showing increasing average expenses. 
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Rothbard  is  not  very  explicit  regarding  factor  pricing  under 
monopolistic  conditions.  True,  he  stresses  that  monopoly  price 
must be understood as a catallactic phenomenon and, as such, a 
phenomenon which is not independent from the general pricing 
and resource allocation process. However, though he explains as 
well that the implied restriction of production releases factors for 
other uses and allows an expansion in other fields of production, he 
does not provide us with a thorough explanation of the impact on 
prices for factors and, as a consequence, on net income distribution 
among original production factors and capitalists. The only clear-cut 
welfare implications he stresses are centered on people as consumers. 
Monopoly  price  implies  that  consumers  are  hurt  because  of  the 
higher price they have to pay for a lower available supply of the 
monopolized good and because of the corresponding misallocation 
and  a  higher  price  always  implies  lower  proceeds:  the  demand  is  elastic  on 
whatever range we consider. Mises decides 5 is the competitive price. According 
to the inelasticity criterion, there is therefore no room for a monopoly price. But 
Mises writes that “the monopoly price most favorable to the monopolist is 7” 
(6, 7 and 8 are monopoly prices)! The reason of course is that, given the figures 
he chooses, the expenses required diminish more than the proceeds when one 
reduces the scale of production. See also Vernon Mund (1933, pp. 130–32) on the 
role of increasing and decreasing average expenses for production.
Rothbard claimed in Power and Market that “The monopolist, as a receiver of a 
monopoly privilege, will be able to achieve a monopoly price for the product if 
his demand curve is inelastic, or sufficiently less elastic, above the free-market 
price” (Rothbard 2004, p. 1090), while he omitted the “sufficiently less elastic” 
condition in an otherwise similarly worded passage in his previously published 
Man, Economy, and State (Rothbard 2004, p. 904). He did not explain the addition 
in Power and Market but one can certainly see that it makes perfect sense, and 
why, in light of Mises’s example above.
It should be noticed too that in the original exposition of monopoly price theory, 
Menger does not claim that demand should necessarily be inelastic above the 
competitive price for a monopoly price to emerge though the numerical example 
he gives focuses only on demand for the product and therefore requires inelasticity 
of demand. Instead, he briefly mentions production as a part of the general problem 
and states in this context that the relevant consideration is the “maximum profit” 
for the monopolist, not the highest proceeds, and that the monopolist restricts the 
supply produced and sold in so far as his “profits” are positively affected by such 
a restriction (Menger 1994, pp. 211–16). This is perfectly compatible with elasticity 
of demand provided average expenses fall enough when production is restricted. 
Confusion can be easily avoided with the help of Frank Fetter’s distinction between 
a “crude monopoly price” and a “monopoly price.” See Fetter (1915, pp. 80–84). 
The crude monopoly price yields the maximum gross receipts given an already 
produced stock and therefore requires an inelastic demand. The monopoly price 
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of factors in the economy. As far as distributive effects on incomes 
are concerned, Rothbard only stresses the monopoly gain accruing 
to the holder of the privilege. And this additional net income seems 
to be entirely “extracted” from people as consumers, so to speak.
IMPLICATIONS FOR FACTOR PRICING
The  key  elements  to  understanding  the  factors’  side  of  the 
monopolistic price issue are the following. First, when coercion 
bars some existing or would-be capitalists to sell a product, this 
ipso facto bars them from renting or buying the factors required 
in its production, and vice versa. In other words, we do not only 
have  here  a  “monopoly  of  supply”  for  the  product,  but  also  a 
“monopoly of demand” for its factors such as the one suggested by 
Mises above.15 These are the two sides of the same coin. Friedrich 
von Wieser (1927, p. 219) hinted at this when he wrote that
The demand-monopoly is at all times accompanied by a monopoly of 
supply. Thus, for example, the state in its tobacco-monopoly combines 
the  two  institutions.  The  administration  of  the  monopoly  does  not 
admit in the home-market, other purchasers of raw tobacco; it combines 
with  a  monopoly  of  the  supply  of  tobacco-products,  which  affects 
the consumers, a demand-monopoly, affecting the domestic tobacco 
growers. A further illustration is found in the actual demand-monopoly of 
a sugar-combine by virtue of its monopoly of supply. In this case, no other 
concern can make use of the sugar beets, and hence no other concern is 
likely to demand them.16 (emphasis added)
That monopoly of demand for factors is a counterpart of monopoly 
of supply for its product implies a downward pressure on factor prices 
in the monopolized sector, as we will see. Second, when a monopolist 
takes advantage of an inelastic demand for the good it sells, this 
implies lower spending from its buyers on other goods (Rothbard 
2004, pp. 280–88) and a downward pressure on prices for their factors. 
15 See Mises’s first quote on page 52.
16   Wieser  does  not  draw  on  this  to  build  the  integrated  and  unified  theory  of 
monopoly with demand-monopoly and supply-monopoly as two sides of the 
same coin that we propose, but he certainly enters the path toward this inte-
gration. one must realize that Wieser’s point is praxeological and can therefore 
be considered as a part of pure economic theory, provided that one keeps in mind 
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overall, the pressure on factor prices coming from inside and outside 
of the monopolized sector should therefore be downward. Let us go 
back then to the monopoly price theory as held by Rothbard and 
elaborate its mirror-image in the markets for factors of production 
with the help of theses two insights. The first sheds some light on the 
“microeconomic” picture of the monopolized sector, the second on 
the “macroeconomic” picture with all sectors considered.
THE MICROECONOMIC PICTURE:  
FOCUS ON THE MONOPOLIzED SECTOR
In  the  free  market  world,  original  factors  earn  their  full 
discounted  marginal  productivity  (DMVP)  when  entrepreneurs 
make no mistakes. They earn more or less than their DMVP when 
entrepreneurs make erroneous forecasts, more or less depending on 
how “overpriced” or “underpriced” factors are. In any case, they 
command a free market price resulting from peaceful association. 
What happens when a grant of privilege to an entrepreneur-capitalist 
(or group of capitalists) is introduced? In a position to profit from a 
coercion-distorted demand schedule for his (or their) product, he 
(or they) will require and want fewer units of divisible factors than 
the total amount hired under free market conditions. Entrepreneurs 
who would otherwise rent the other units in this industry are not 
allowed to do so and they will have to go elsewhere. So what about 
the price of the remaining units of a divisible factor?
Granted,  since  the  monopolists  will  employ  fewer  units, 
the  discounted  marginal  value  productivity  of  the  factor  will 
accordingly  be  higher  in  this  use.  The  remaining  units  could 
then be employed profitably at an even higher price than the free 
market price. But the monopolist is certainly able to pay less than 
his maximum buying price for the restricted quantity of factors. 
Would he still have to pay the free market price? Each remaining 
unit of these lower supplies would be rented at the free market 
price if the supply schedules for these factors in this use were 
purely elastic and were not shifting. But they can only be purely 
elastic if they are non-specific to this process and if we are in the 
neoclassical land of “pure and perfect competition.”
But as Rothbard (2004, p. 721) explained in regard to the elasticity 
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market is the addition of each seller’s contribution. As a consequence, 
a seller adding to the supply, even a very small quantity, implies that 
the new total cannot be sold at the same price but at a lower price 
because of the law of marginal utility. There is no question that an 
individual firm could push or restrict its production without any 
impact on its price. The pure and perfect competition situation is not 
even a possibility among several cases. It is strictly impossible. No 
demand for the product of an individual seller can ever be perfectly 
elastic. The same goes for the supply of factors as well.17 Supply 
schedules are subject to the law of marginal utility too. Therefore no 
individual or market supply schedule can ever be perfectly elastic.
Since the supply of factors in each of their uses will necessarily 
be less than purely elastic, the monopolist may be able to pay the 
factors he uses at a lower price than the free market price in the 
absence of entrepreneurs who could otherwise bid them away in 
this industry up to the free market level.18, 19 And the monopolist 
17 See Rothbard (2004, p. 718).
18   one could object, with Fritz Machlup, (1967, p. 40) to the idea of monopoly 
of supply for products implying monopoly of demand or “monopsony” for 
their factors that someone might be the sole seller of a good and be one among 
many buyers of the factors required in its production. However, Machlup’s 
stricture that “there is nothing in the logic of things or in the reality of economic 
conditions that necessarily makes a monopolist also a monopsonist” would not 
follow. Machlup’s point is explicitly dependent on the neo-classical  framework 
of “pure and perfect competition.” Starting from there, imperfect competition 
in the product’s market can conceivably be introduced while pure and perfect 
competition would still prevail in the factors’ markets. Being a monopolist in 
the market for the product would not alter one’s position as a “price-taker” as 
far as factor prices are concerned. However, once we recognize with Rothbard 
that pure and perfect competition and the “logic of things” are incompatible—in 
other words, that pure and perfect competition cannot exist and that there can 
never be any pure price-taker in the real world—the idea of an independence 
of  a  capitalist’s  position  as  a  seller  and  his  position  as  a  buyer  vanishes. 
Furthermore, even in the neo-classical framework, the situation is not as clear 
as Machlup suggests. Since the monopolist’s demand for a factor is supposed 
to diminish, the total demand for the factor is lowered and its market price 
lowered as the new total demand meets the total supply schedule at a lower 
price. Then each firm competing for the use of this factor in different uses must 
still face a perfectly elastic supply schedule but this schedule has shifted. See on 
this Bellante and Jackson (1983, p. 189).
19   Saying that the restriction on buying allows the price to fall does not imply that 
this lower price is a monopoly or “monopsony” price. In the market for the 
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can pay them less because there is nothing implied in the monopo-
listic pattern of actions we analyze that would make entrepreneurs 
bid away these factors in other industries (that would shift factors’ 
supply schedules in the monopolized sector in a way that coun-
teracts the downward pressure). No tendency involved can trigger 
a higher demand for the factor in non-restricted industries20 that 
would  counteract  the  downward  pressure  in  the  monopolized 
sector, as we will see detailed below.21
In other words, the monopoly gain of the holder of privilege 
does not only come from the consumers but also from the factors 
he  employs,  including  capital  goods.  However,  capitalists’  net 
returns in earlier stages of production do not have to decrease. As 
with a sales tax shifted backward (Rothbard 2004, pp. 1156–62), the 
burden must be borne by original factors to the extent that lower 
prices for capital goods were anticipated by the capitalists who 
invested in their production. The lower prices for capital goods 
will translate into lower demands and prices for original factors 
involved in their production and the margins could stay the same. 
Lower prices for capital goods are imputed backward to original 
factors of production, land and labor factors.22
to Lord Coke’s definition above) without the new price being a monopoly price. 
Prohibition of imports in a certain area for example could bring about such an 
outcome, not because sellers would then be able to find an agreement and exploit 
an inelastic market demand but because some efficient firms would have been 
excluded and only “high-costs” firms would remain. We would not call such a 
higher price a monopoly price. In other words, even if monopoly has an impact 
on price, be it a monopoly of supply or demand, monopoly is not sufficient for a 
monopoly/monopsony price to emerge.
20   This is not strictly correct. As we will see below, in some unlikely cases, the 
monopolist will not be able to pay lower prices for factors he uses.
21   In the case of a “monopoly price” reached without an inelastic demand, this 
would of course not be true anymore and one would find here a result similar to 
what happens in the case of the maximum price control, except that the higher 
demands triggered in other sectors would not be high enough to entirely coun-
teract the downward pressure. See below why this must be the case.
22   For this reason, from now on, we will focus exclusively on original factors’ 
prices. However, one must keep in mind that to the extent that lower prices 
for capital goods were not anticipated by the capitalists who invested in their 
production, original factors do not suffer. Their employers make losses instead, 
at least in the “short run,” a short run that may conceivably last for years, until 
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This should not be surprising. As previously noted, for example 
by Salin (1996, pp. 152–55), taxation and regulation are to a large 
extent equivalent. At the very least, both imply uninvited border 
crossing on some people’s peacefully obtained properties. As a 
consequence, the same set of disincentives to acquire them through 
production and voluntary exchange must come into play, hence 
the lower demands for factors required in their production. As 
with taxes, monopolistic grants of privilege make entrance into the 
market more costly than otherwise and excluded investors retire 
from the bidding process on factors that they do not rent anymore 
on the margin.
THE MACROECONOMIC PICTURE:  
ALL SECTORS AND DEGREES OF SPECIFICITY OF 
FACTORS CONSIDERED
Now it is true that the effect on factor prices employed in the 
monopolized  sector  may  be  spectacular  or  almost  insignificant 
depending on their degree of specificity. And as we have already 
hinted, the demand schedules for substitutes to the monopolized 
goods and the demand for their factors will be altered. Therefore, 
the  pricing  of  factors  used  in  both  the  production  of  these 
substitutes  and  the  monopolized  industry  will  accordingly  be 
affected. And  even  the  pricing  of  factors  that  have  nothing  to 
do with the production of the monopolized good will be altered 
somehow. To expand on our analysis and get the complete macro-
economic picture, let’s consider a hypothetical scenario where each 
possible case is covered and considered in turn. Say that A is the 
monopolized product. Their producers face an inelastic demand 
above its free market price.
First, the fate of factor 1 engaged in the production of A is clear. 
Factor 1 is purely specific to the production of A. Some units of 
it that would be employed in the free market will remain idle in 
this world since they have nowhere else to go. The other units will 
be paid at a somewhat lower price, depending on how high the 
reservation demand is, but lower in any case than the free market 
the shift is immediate and complete when no one errs in anticipating the prices 
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price. By definition of its specificity, the reservation demand has 
nothing to do with what units of this factor could earn elsewhere 
since they cannot be employed elsewhere. The price will then 
generally be lower than if it were non-specific. There may even 
be a bargaining situation between the monopolist and the most 
eager seller if the net revenue-maximizing level of production 
requires so few units of this factor that only one seller could make 
a deal with the buyer. In the most extreme conceivable case, the 
factor is made artificially superabundant and commands no price 
at all. For example, one can think of an existing large supply of 
diamond mines. Suppose that they are normally scarce relative 
to needs. As a consequence, they command a price on the free 
market.  With  a  monopoly  in  the  sale  of  the  finished  product, 
the optimal level of production for the monopolist could be low 
enough that there would always be a diamond mine available 
for free somewhere. This would bar anybody from trying to sell 
the use of a similar mine to him. Then diamond mines would no 
longer be scarce.23
Second, factor 2 is not specific to the production of A. It can be 
employed in the production of good B. Accordingly, its reservation 
demand in use A will reflect this. Under monopoly in sector A, 
more units will go into use B than under free market conditions. 
Their  supply  is  then  higher  in  this  industry  and  their  price 
everywhere is then lower. However, this is not all that can be said 
regarding factor 2. Rothbard’s discussion on the interdependence 
of  prices  for  consumers’  goods  comes  into  play.  The  higher 
spending on the monopolized good (compared to its free market 
level) implies lower spending elsewhere.24 Demand schedules for 
goods other than A will in general tend to shift toward a lower 
level. Suppose that the demand for B is lower. The DMVP schedule 
of factor 2 in this use as well as its general DMVP will be lower 
than on the free market. Accordingly, the downward pressure on 
23 I am indebted to Joseph Salerno for this point.
24   We assume here that overall consumption stays the same. The only thing that 
is  different  between  the  two  situations  compared  is  free  entry  or  hampered 
entry in producing and selling good A. No preferences need to be different and 
accordingly, neither the ratio of consumption vs. investment spending nor the 
relation between the money supply and the money demand need to be affected, 
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its price is reinforced compared to the situation where factor 2 
would simply have to suffer its exclusion from the production of 
A, while the monopolist may obtain a higher monopoly gain than 
otherwise.25, 26 We then see that the non-specificity of a factor does 
not necessarily mitigate the impact of monopoly on its price. In 
this case, it amounts to a double burden.
owners  of  factor  3  will  only  suffer  a  single  burden  because 
like factor 2, it is nonspecific to the production of A but cannot 
be employed in industry B which suffers a lower demand for its 
product. It is employed in the production of good C for which the 
demand schedule stays the same.
Factor 4 is employed in industry C too but cannot be employed 
in A or anywhere where the demands for the products are lower. 
And it is a complementary good to factor 3 in this process. Then 
since production is higher than in the free market here because of 
the extra use of factor 3 displaced from A, its demand and price 
may be somewhat higher.
owners  of  factor  5  will  suffer  though  it  is  not  employed  in 
the production of A. It is employed in the production of B or in 
whatever  production  of  goods  for  which  the  demand  is  lower 
than in the free market. As a consequence, its DMVP there and in 
general are lower than in the free market. No employer is able to 
directly extract a monopoly rent from its use however.
Factor  6  will  neither  suffer  nor  benefit.  Wherever  its  DMVP 
becomes lower, a higher demand in another use guarantees that 
the general DMVP schedule and the price stay the same than in 
the free market.
The owners of factor 7 are lucky. It is employed in industry E 
that sees its demand increased. It is either specific to this sector 
25   It should be noticed that the downward pressure in sector B translates into a 
higher factor supply schedule in sector A. Actually, it should be clear that in both 
sectors, the restrictive pressure pushes away the factor so that there might not 
be a transfer of units from A to B but from A and B to nowhere, unemployment 
that is. This is accounted for in the forward sloping nature of the general supply 
schedule of the factor for all its uses.
26   However,  if  every  future  development  were  anticipated  from  the  start,  only 
the first owner of the grant would benefit since the monopoly gains would be 
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or it is not, but if not, its higher DMVP schedule here more than 
compensates  for  the  lower  maximum  buying  prices  in  other 
sectors where it could be employed. Its general DMVP schedule is 
then higher and it receives a higher price than in the free market. 
How could the demand for a product increase, especially since we 
established that the general trend is for demands for substitutes 
to A to decrease and that all goods but A, strictly speaking, are 
substitutes  for  A?  There  are  two  possibilities.  First,  one  must 
realize that some people may have elastic demand schedules for 
the  monopolized  product  above  the  free  market  price.27  These 
people will spend more outside of the monopolized sector and 
may conceivably make some market demand schedules in other 
sectors higher. Second, the monopolist too spends, not only part 
of what he earns as a capitalist, but also its monopoly gain.28 If his 
additional demands for different goods come as a substitute to the 
lower demands for these goods by the buyers of his product and the 
factor owners who have a lower income to spend as a consequence 
of the monopolist’s actions, then no higher market demand will 
appear. But since people from each side of the distribution effect 
may have different preferences regarding the composition of their 
spending, the monopolist as an income spender can conceivably 
push the demand up for one or several goods. Therefore, some 
factors employed there can gain from it, while demand schedules 
in other sectors will be lower.29
The owners of factor 8 are very fortunate. They are a possible—
almost  miraculous—anomaly  and  are  represented  here  just  for 
the sake of completeness. The price of factor 8 is not reduced in 
the monopoly situation and the monopolist cannot extract from 
them a monopoly gain though he uses the factor. The reason is 
the following. It is not specific to the production of A but can be 
employed in the production of good E, the demand for which is 
higher than in the free market because of the monopolist or the 
27   I am indebted to G.P. Manish for bringing my attention to this insight. The market 
demand for the monopolized good is the sum of its components, the individual 
demand schedules. That the market demand would be inelastic above the free 
market price does not require that each and every individual schedule should be.
28 I am indebted to Philipp Bagus for bringing to my attention this consideration.
29   Again, we assume here that the overall proportion of consumption in total spending 
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people who have elastic demand schedules for the monopolized 
good above its free market price. Its DMVP there, and its general 
DMVP  schedule  as  well,  then  compensates  for  the  downward 
pressure related to the monopolist’s restriction. He rents fewer 
units of them and earns his monopoly gain from the consumers 
and other factors, but these units of factor 8 are employed at the 
free market price because of the additional spending on goods E 
that they produce. Conceivably, in an even more extreme case, 
factor 8 could even command a higher price than in the free market 
if its DMVP schedule in the expanded industry were even higher 
(e.g.,  because  the  monopolist  spends  all  his  monopoly  income 
there), and if the monopolist would still have an incentive to pay 
him such a high price. He would have the incentive if this higher 
price were more than compensated by some sharp reduction in his 
expenses on other factors (e.g., if many of them are purely specific 
and without reservation demand). 
The table below recapitulates for each and every factor with the 
“+”, “-” and “0” signs when factors’ DMVP schedules and prices 
are higher, lower or the same under monopoly than under free 
market conditions. 
Table 1
1 Types of Factors 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0 - 0 + - 0 + +








A A A A C C B D E E B
0 0 0 0 0 + - 0 + + -
Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No No No No No
To summarize, the mirror image in original factors’ markets of a 
monopoly price for a product with an inelastic demand schedule 
above the free market price is the following. Some factors will 
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1. they are specific to the monopolized industry
2.     their  general  DMVP  schedule  is  lower  as  a  result  of  the 
overall lower position of demand schedules for the goods 
they help to produce
3.     their general DMVP schedule is unchanged, but the factor is 
under monopolistic pressure.30
Some factors will command their free market prices if a downward 
pressure  in  some  sectors  is  paralleled  by  an  upward  pressure 
somewhere else. Finally, some factors may command higher prices 
thanks to the monopolist’s additional spending, thanks to addi-
tional spending of buyers who have an elastic demand schedule for 
the monopolized good, or if they are complementary to displaced 
factors in industries consequently expanding.
THE MACROECONOMIC PICTURE:  
AGGREGATE IMPACT ON ORIGINAL FACTORS’ 
INCOMES AND PRICES
Since  some  factors  may  command  a  higher  price  for  their 
services while others will command the same or lower prices, 
it would then seem there is no systematic impact of monopoly 
on original factors’ prices. As in any usual other case of inter-
vention  covered  by  Mises  and  Rothbard,  some  laborers  and 
landowners lose while others win. However, such a conclusion 
would overlook decisive facts. First, it should be clear that most 
cases above of higher prices, though conceivable, require some 
empirically heroic hypothesis. Second, there can hardly be any 
doubt  about  the  aggregate  impact  on  factor  prices.  We  know 
that net income in the economy over a period of time equals 
30   one must realize, as shown in the table above with factor 1 and factor 3 that 
a lower general DMVP schedule is not necessary to have a lower price. In the 
monopolized sector, the DMVP schedule for the factor—the maximum buying 
prices schedule for each hypothetical quantity that is—remains unaffected. The 
point is, absent competition, the capitalist does not have to pay his maximum 
buying price for the marginal unit. Conceivably, price could be lower even with 
a higher DMVP schedule provided it is not high enough to compensate for the 
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consumption spending for this period.31 Given time preferences 
and  unchanged  demand  and  supply  schedules  for  money, 
aggregate consumption spending stays the same. But then, for 
the monopolist to gain additional monetary revenue compared to 
what he would earn on the free market, other incomes have to be 
curtailed in the same process of production and/or elsewhere.
As  we  have  seen,  the  originary  interest  rate  and  investment 
spending do not need to be altered.32 Therefore interest income is 
not altered and land and labor factors must bear the brunt. Though 
some of them may gain in the process, aggregate land and labor 
income must be reduced as a counterpart to the existence of a 
monopoly gain somewhere.  And since the stock of labor and land 
factors are the same, this implies an overall tendency toward lower 
prices for these factors.33, 34
31   See Rothbard (2004) for discussions of these aggregates and the description of the 
structure of production, in particular chaps. 5, 6 and 8 of Man, Economy, and State.
32   Admittedly,  they  could  be  altered  because  of  the  redistribution  implied.  The 
beneficiaries may be more or less present-oriented than the losers. But since no 
systematic impact can be predicted in either way, we assume that this remains 
unchanged to concentrate on consequences that can be unambiguously displayed. 
We assume that the altered pattern of spending on investment and consumption 
by the monopolist is counterbalanced by a symmetric alteration in the spending 
pattern of the losers so that aggregate consumption and investment, as well as 
the originary interest rate, are the same in both worlds. And in any case, even 
if interest is changed, factors’ incomes are still reduced compared to what they 
would be with an identical change in intertemporal spending that would have 
occurred for other reasons than monopolistic restrictions.
33   Actually, this is true even in the case of a monopoly price reached with an elastic 
demand schedule above the free market price. Granted, the tendency will not 
be as obvious because higher demands in other sectors will trigger higher factor 
prices there. But they cannot rise enough to cancel a fall in aggregate land and 
labor income because it remains true that if a monopoly gain emerges somewhere, 
aggregate land and labor income have to fall, with a given net social income.
34   Another related consequence is the following. Insofar as some units of factors 
will leave production as they become submarginal, overall physical production 
will be reduced and individuals will have to suffer such an impact as consumers. 
This is again an illustration of equivalence between taxation and regulation. As 
taxes reduce the owners of factors’ incentives to put them into productive use for 
a market or to get them in the first place, production for the market is reduced 
and a mutually beneficial division of labor between members of society is forced 
out of existence. Taxation and monopolistic grants of privilege ultimately carry 
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GENERAL IMPACT ON LABOR FACTORS AS 
COMPARED TO LAND FACTORS
Finally, it is important to stress that the downward pressure on 
the original factors’ prices is distributed throughout the economy 
and not limited to what happens in the monopolized sector since, as 
we have seen, one must take into account the interrelations between 
markets involved in the monopoly pattern of action. It may even be 
more widespread for labor factors than for land. Empirically, human 
beings  embody  the  capacity  of  selling  their  services  as  different 
labor factors, of different quantities and qualities depending on the 
abilities of each. As Rothbard showed, such an empirical fact implies 
a particular connection between all labor markets:
Labor, though hardly homogeneous, is a peculiarly nonspecific factor. 
Therefore, higher wage rates for one set of factors will tend to stimulate 
other laborers to train themselves or bestir themselves to enter this 
particular  “market.”  Since  skills  differ,  this  does  not  mean  that  all 
wages will be equalized. It does mean, however, that general supply 
curves for a labor factor will also be forward sloping.” (Rothbard 2004, 
p. 573, emphasis in the original)
Because of this connection and taking due account of substitution 
effects between factors, the downward pressure on labor prices 
implied in the monopolist policy framework, though consequently 
mitigated,35 will be even more widespread in the economy than we 
have suggested it to be.
CONCLUSION
The aim of this paper was to show that and explain how grants 
of monopolistic privileges to capitalists can lower labor and land 
factors’ prices compared to what would prevail in a free market 
environment.  We  explain  how  monopoly  gains  of  privileged 
business owners are not only “extracted” from their clients but 
also  from  factor  owners.  In  so  doing,  we  revisit  Rothbardian 
35   The higher the elasticity of the supply curves, the less room there is for the 
employer to lower the price paid. Most economists would put it this way: in the 
“long run,” supply curves are more elastic than in the “short run,” so that the 
monopoly gain extracted from each unit of the factor is lower.67 Xavier Méra: Factor Prices Under Monopoly
monopoly price theory and extend it to the realm of factor pricing 
to obtain a more integrated understanding of monopoly theory. 
Monopolistic  grants  to  capitalists  make  for  market  situations 
where  both  monopoly  of  demand  for  factors  and  monopoly 
of supply for their product are present and inextricably inter-
twined. As a consequence, we conclude that monopoly price for 
a product implies lower prices for its factors. Combined with 
established considerations regarding inelasticity of demand for 
the monopolized product, its impact on markets for substitutes 
and the interdependence of factor markets (in particular labor 
markets), we show how grants of privileges to capitalists can 
trigger an overall downward pressure on original factor prices.
The  implications  might  be  numerous  and  point  out  toward 
further researches in pure theory and history. First, it is clear that 
the widespread impact of monopoly would barely be existent if we 
only had a small monopoly island in the middle of a free market 
ocean. More privileges granted to capitalists in different sectors 
imply a greater tendency for monopoly prices to prevail and a 
more drastic downward pressure on factor prices. But how far can 
it go? Undoubtedly, the whole array of prices could not become a 
monopoly price structure. As Mises explains, under a system of 
all-around  monopolistic  privileges  (under  corporativism  or  the 
guild system), there is nothing left of a market economy. There are 
no prices in the catallactic sense. Therefore, there are neither free 
market prices (obviously) nor monopoly prices in such a world.36 
But some questions remain: how far can the monopoly price scheme 
and the related downward pressure on factor prices conceivably 
be pushed before we enter the world of corporativism? And can 
we establish in more detail what fate is reserved for original factors 
beyond this limit and under corporativism or socialism?
Second, our study should make clear that insofar as Austrian 
criticisms of the Marxist theory of surplus value are correct, it does 
not follow that one should throw out the “exploitation of labor” 
baby  with  the  Marxist  bathwater.37  Under  monopoly,  land  and 
especially labor can indeed be “exploited” in the sense that they can 
36 See Mises (1998a, p. 816).
37   See Marx (1969), Marx (1990, chap. 1) and Austrian answers in Böhm-Bawerk 
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be paid under their free market level as a consequence of coercion. 
They can be “underpaid” either because their employers are able 
to underbid factors below their discounted marginal productivity 
level38 and/or because their marginal productivity schedules are 
lowered as a by-product of coercion, as we have seen above. The 
corresponding redistribution in favor of some capitalists implies 
in  turn  a  relative  “proletarianization”  of  some  workers.  These 
are all the laborers whose lower wages are not compensated by 
higher incomes coming from some investments in the privileged 
sectors, either because their monopoly gains are not high enough, 
because they have no money invested in these sectors, because the 
gains have already been capitalized before they came, or because 
they are not investors at all (usually the lowest-paid workers). 
With a lower total monetary income, they are less likely to present 
themselves as investors on the time market and the distribution 
of catallactic functions among people tends to become more rigid. 
These  insights  may  provide  for  a  “missing  link”  in  previous 
Austrian-informed political economy essays such as Hoppe (2006) 
and  Grinder  &  Hagel  III  (1977),  which  intended,  among  other 
things, to outline a general theory of who benefits and who suffers 
from “State Capitalism.”
Third,  a  thorough  analysis  of  interactions  between  these 
monopolistic grants and other interventions in the market that may 
conceivably compound their effects or counteract each other to some 
extent would be required. Finally, based on such a big theoretical 
picture, one would then be able to make an empirical assessment of 
how far monopoly and exploitation of original factors went in the 
real world, past and present, here, there and everywhere.
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